The Australian Government\u27s abandoned infrastructure outsourcing program: \u27fiasco\u27, or relatively typical? by Rouse, Anne & Corbitt, Brian
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ACIS 2002 Proceedings Australasian (ACIS)
12-31-2002
The Australian Government's abandoned
infrastructure outsourcing program: 'fiasco', or
relatively typical?
Anne Rouse
University of Melbourne
Brian Corbitt
Deakin University
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2002
This material is brought to you by the Australasian (ACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ACIS 2002
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Rouse, Anne and Corbitt, Brian, "The Australian Government's abandoned infrastructure outsourcing program: 'fiasco', or relatively
typical?" (2002). ACIS 2002 Proceedings. 80.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2002/80
  1  
The Australian Government’s Abandoned Infrastructure Outsourcing 
Program: ‘fiasco’, or relatively typical? 
Anne C. Rouse 
Department of Information Systems 
University of Melbourne 
acrouse@forensys.com.au 
Brian J. Corbitt 
School of Information Systems 
Deakin University 
Abstract  
Early in 2001, after a damning public report by the Auditor-General, the Australian Federal 
Government was forced to abandon its highly promoted “whole of government” infrastructure 
outsourcing initiative. This about-face was greeted in the press with reports that the initiative 
was a ‘fiasco’. Yet a four-year case study of the initiative suggests a more complex picture. 
The initiative can be viewed in a quite different light on the basis of comparisons with a 
contemporary survey of 240 Australian organisations engaged in IT outsourcing. This 
reveals that many of the negative outcomes associated with this ‘fiasco’ are typical of those 
experienced by large Australian organisations. This has important implications for decision 
makers confronted with choices about sourcing IT service delivery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 24 July 2001 an article appeared in the influential IT pages of The Australian claiming 
that as a result of the “Federal Government IT outsourcing fiasco” many public and private 
sector organisations were rethinking their attitudes to IT outsourcing. The article stated that 
“concerns about the handling of federal outsourcing had turned private industry off the whole 
concept” (Mitchell, 2001a:31). This article highlights the controversy surrounding the Federal 
Government’s outsourcing of its IT infrastructure. Six weeks later, the issue again hit the 
headlines in The Australian with a report that the 2000 Senate Finance and Public 
Administration References Committee had found the initiative was seriously flawed (Mitchell, 
2001b:41). Between 1998 and 2001 the initiative was rarely out of the headlines for long.  
This paper reports a four year study of the Federal government whole-of-government IT 
infrastructure outsourcing initiative, The paper provides a brief outline of the case; reports 
the data sources used; considers several key observations that can be made about the 
case, and presents several implications these have for decision makers.  
CASE SYNOPSIS 
In April 1997, the Federal Australian Government announced that by 1999 it intended to 
outsource the delivery of IT infrastructure (mainframe, server, and desktop services, and in 
some cases telecommunications) for most federal agencies. This initiative would lead to 
saving of up to A$1 billion, boost local industry development, and provide access to new 
technologies. Savings were to occur through the use of external vendors, and the 
consolidation of requirements across government agencies, which would, in some cases, be 
clustered to form cross-agency contracts. The decision created some controversy, and was 
examined by an ongoing Senate Inquiry (SFPARC, 1997). Expecting some internal 
resistance to the initiative, and anxious that projected cost reductions not be dissipated, in 
the 1997 budget Government deducted from line budgets the 15% savings expected to 
accrue from outsourcing IT.  
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In 1999, the Federal Auditor-General independently decided to review the outcomes of the 
first four contracts under this initiative. His September 2000 Report (ANAO, 2000) found that 
the ambitious timetable established by the Federal Government had not been met, and that 
the costs of market testing and contracting had blown out substantially (by over $AUD26 
million). Most of these cost blow-outs were related to the costs of specialist international 
consultants, including ‘Big 5” accounting firms, outsourcing advisors, and the outsourcing 
legal specialists, Shaw Pittman. These advisors were engaged to facilitate the 
implementation of the initiative. The Auditor-General also found that, contrary to Government 
claims, only one of the first four contracts, the contract for “Cluster 3”, was likely to deliver 
any substantial savings, and that actual savings after twelve months were less than half of 
those projected at the time the contract was signed. At the same time the Auditor-General 
found that outsourcing had a number of negative consequences on the operational business 
of agencies.  
The Auditor-General’s Report re-ignited community opposition to the initiative, and led the 
Government, late in 2000, to commission an independent inquiry to examine the risks 
associated with the initiative (the Humphry Inquiry). In January 2001 the Federal 
Government released the Humphry Report (Humphry, 2000), which recommended that the 
centralised and consolidated approach to IT outsourcing be discontinued. However, agency 
line managers would still be required to evaluate the outsourcing of their IT infrastructure 
services and justify their decision if they chose not to outsource. The Humphry Report did 
not address the issue of cost savings, but instead found that the risks associated with the 
consolidated approach were higher than had been expected, particularly implementation 
risks, or the risk to the agencies’ operations.  
The first four contracts for the initiative, those reviewed by the Auditor-General, are listed 
below: 
Agency Value Won by Date 
‘Cluster 3’ – DIMA*, AEC* and four small agencies $160m CSC Mar-98 
Department of Employment, Training and Youth Affairs and 
Employment National (DEETYA-EN) 
$300m Cancelled  Jun-98 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) $490m IBM/GSA Jun-99 
‘Group 5’ – five small agencies $90m Advantra Jul-99 
*DIMA: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, AEC: Australian Electoral Commission 
Table 1: Agencies analysed by the Auditor-General’s Whole Of Government IT Infrastructure 
Outsourcing Initiative Review (ANAO, 2000) 
Contrary to suggestions made elsewhere (e.g. Seddon, 2001; Willcocks’ submission to 
SFPARC, 2001), although relatively large in scope, the whole of government outsourcing 
initiative was not an example of “total outsourcing”. Instead, involving only infrastructure IT 
services and accounting for around half of IT expenditure (SFPARC, 1997; 2001), the 
initiative was an example of “selective outsourcing”. Thus the case provides interesting 
insights into the failure of a strategy that has been described by Lacity and Willcocks 
(2001:6) as generally likely to succeed. 
METHODOLOGY 
This case study was analysed using hermeneutic textual analysis. Hermeneutic analysis is a 
process used to identify contextual explanations for apparent contradictions found in 
qualitative text-based data. The textual material is repeatedly sifted and compared to find 
cross-verification and contradictions. Understanding emerges from the comparison between 
new and previous information. The strategy is akin to the work of a historian sifting through 
competing accounts of past events and motivations. Text sources used by the authors 
included:  
• Notes from interviews conducted between 1997 and 2001 with 16 informants 
working for 9 Federal agencies, or for their IT service vendors. In most cases, 
informants were interviewed more than once; 
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• A literature review based on press reports related to Australian IT outsourcing 
between 1997 and May 2001; 
• Detailed analysis of a number of Federal and State government reports, 
particularly the 1997, 1998 and 2000 Senate Finance and Public Administration 
References Committee Inquiries into outsourcing initiatives (SFPARC 1997; 
2001), the Auditor-General’s Report (ANAO, 2000); and the Humphry Report 
(cited as Humphry, 2001);  
• Walker and Walker’s (2000) broad based analysis of government outsourcing in 
Australia; 
• A study of the case by Seddon (2001) that is drawn from the Auditor-General’s 
and Humphry Reports;  
• Analyses prepared for members of parliament by the Parliamentary Library 
Politics and Public Administration Group (Verspaandonk 2001a; 2001b);  
• Notes from a series of focus groups involving 56 respondents reporting on their 
experiences of IT outsourcing; and 
• Re-analysis of a University of Melbourne IT outsourcing survey of 1000 large 
sites in Australia distributed in 2000 (Rouse, 2002). This survey was conducted 
by a team of five that included Rouse, Seddon, and Willcocks (an initial report is 
found in Seddon et al., 2000). 
KEY FINDINGS 
The authors’ research into the case revealed several key findings (discussed below) that 
provide a lens through which the case can be interpreted.  
The 15% savings target 
Although the initiative encountered problems in a number of areas, it is unlikely that it would 
have been abandoned if it had met its key goal: to provide savings of 15%. These savings 
expectations arose on the basis of expert advice received from vendors, industry specialists, 
consultants and academics.  
At the time vendor bids were assessed, detailed costings were carried out by the agency 
tasked with managing the initiative (the Office of Government IT, or OGIT) under the 
guidance of specialist consultants, and in consultation with agency management and IT 
staff. These bids in turn were sought only after extensive research had been undertaken of 
the services likely to be required, and the costs of internal service delivery. Analysis at the 
time vendors were selected suggested savings of up to 28% were likely, and a target of 15% 
would have appeared achievable. However, the Auditor-General’s analysis (ANAO, 2000) 
revealed that despite relying on world-class consulting advice, the cost and savings 
projections for two of the arrangements (ATO and Group 5) were flawed. Decision makers 
had failed to take into account additional cash streams associated with equipment that would 
be available at the end of the contract if the services were not outsourced. They had also 
under-estimated the costs of leasing risks absorbed by the agencies. 
As a result, the Auditor-General determined that only Cluster 3 was likely to make any 
substantial savings from the outsourcing arrangements. However, based on the information 
available when the vendor was selected, his projected savings for that group were 28%, 
while the actual savings at the end of the first 12 months of the contract were only 12%  
not enough to reach the apparently conservative 15% target. Five per cent of this 
discrepancy was accounted for by unexpectedly high initial redeployment costs, but there 
was still a substantial gap between the projected 23% savings and the actual 12% achieved. 
Because actual savings had not reached the target and were so much lower than projected 
savings, this result was seen in a negative light. The Auditor-General found that the Cluster 
3 agencies were required to make up the 3% shortfall out of operating budget and that this 
had negative effects on their operational performance. However, examination of the 
literature on IT outsourcing savings, as well as discussions with 56 IT practitioners (Rouse, 
2002) suggests that savings of 12% are at the high end of what can be realistically expected 
from outsourcing IT services. Even savings of this level are only rarely achieved.  
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A contemporary survey of IT outsourcers conducted by the University of Melbourne in late 
1999/early 2000 revealed a quite different picture to that expected by government decision-
makers, but one which confirmed the information coming from the focus groups. In that 
study (240 responses from a sample of 1000 of the top 1600 sites in the country) only a 
minority of selective outsourcing cases (42.4%) reported any savings at all, and only 8.7% 
reported “substantial” savings. These ratios were statistically no different to those for the 
sample as a whole  42.1% and 7.4% respectively (Rouse, 2002). The majority of 
organisations responding to the survey failed to report even moderate savings from 
outsourcing, whether they were government or non-government organisations, medium, 
large or very large organisations, and whatever proportions of their IT budget was 
outsourced (Rouse, 2002). In light of this information, the experiences of the Federal 
initiative can be seen as typical, rather than aberrant.  
Other, smaller contemporary surveys  such as the two reported by Lacity and Willcocks, 
(2000; 2001) with a total of 77 outsourcing respondents, and that by Aubert et al., 2000, with 
70 respondents  also confirmed that IT outsourcing did not result in substantial savings. 
On the other hand, it frequently led to cost increases (in up to 49% of cases according to 
Aubert et al., (1999) and 22% in Seddon (2002)).  
Decision makers went to some trouble to follow recommended practices  
It has been suggested in the press and academic literature that the initiative represents a 
failure by decision-makers to follow recommended practice. Seddon (2001), for example, 
juxtaposes an account of the initiative with what he labels “ten commandments” for good 
practice, implying by doing so that these prescriptions were not followed. Most of these 
prescriptions are based on a range of practices described as “proven” to lead to outsourcing 
success by Lacity and Willcocks in their most recent text (2001:6-16). These practices were 
largely articulated in the mid 90s, after Lacity’s and Hirschheim’s (1993; 1995) series of case 
studies. They had observed that many organisations that experienced substantial problems 
with outsourcing engaged in what could be described as naive behaviour, such as failing to 
carry out thorough investigations of their own and market costs; and signing long contracts 
(10+ years) with a single vendor for substantial proportions of their IT budget, so increasing 
dependence on the vendor. As a result of these case studies Lacity and Hirschheim 
developed a set of prescriptions for good sourcing practices. These were further codified 
and augmented by Lacity and Willcocks on the basis of a post hoc examination of 61 case 
studies one or other author had conducted in Europe and the US (described in Lacity and 
Willcocks, 1998; 2001). 
The authors’ investigation of the federal initiative suggests that “not following recommended 
practices” is an inadequate explanation for the failure. The fact that the government spent 
over $25 million on obtaining and implementing specialist consultant advice related to the 
design and implementation of the program (ANAO, 2000:17) indicates that decision-makers 
were keen to make the arrangement work well. Government had also received advice from 
the IT Review Group (ITRG); the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee, panels of industry 
specialists, and from the Australian Industries Commission. All of this advice suggested that 
if the process was carefully managed, the Government could succeed in achieving the 
targeted 15% savings (and possibly much more) without compromising the operational 
effectiveness. This message is, incidentally, prevalent in current MIS textbooks.  
The evidence gathered by the authors is that the Federal Government spent considerable 
effort in planning for, and implementing the initiative, even though, in hindsight, the costs 
and time involved were greater than had been expected. In this respect they were typical of 
other Australian organisations (Seddon et al., 2000). The case study data gathered by the 
authors suggests that decision-makers followed almost all of the “proven practices” from the 
literature. Of Seddon’s “ten commandments” for IT outsourcing success, there is evidence 
that only one was not followed. This practice relates to allowing the internal IT services 
groups to bid against external vendors. Informants suggested this was an expensive and 
impractical proposition. 
To manage risks, government decision-makers adopted practices recommended by Lacity, 
Hirschheim and Willcocks, and summarised in Lacity and Willcocks (2001). These included:  
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• Selective outsourcing (at around 50% of IT budget); 
• Targeting services thought likely to be generic and “non core”, i.e. infrastructure 
services which Lacity and Willcocks (2001:9) and Seddon et al. (2000:4) have 
suggested are frequently outsourced successfully;  
• Use of short contracts (3 to 5 years);  
• Crafting of detailed and comprehensive contracts that were prepared with the 
advice of specialists;  
• Retaining highly-skilled specialist staff to manage the arrangement;  
• Involving both line and IT management in the decision, even though, in the end, 
senior management (i.e. Cabinet) made the decision;  
• Conducting detailed and extensive analysis of vendor offerings and both internal 
and market prices; and  
• Designing and implementing post-contract management structures and 
processes. Regular formal and informal monitoring and SLA negotiations were 
instituted as part of this process.  
Looking at the management attention and resources devoted to the initiative, the case 
appears to be a textbook example of decision-makers responding to the best available 
advice. This observations raises a critical question: “How likely is it that organisations that do 
implement good management practices will “succeed” in IT outsourcing?”.  
Research which influenced the decision did not necessarily support the decision 
Examination of the Industry Assistance Commission’s report into contracting out, the Senate 
Inquiries and the citations used in discussion papers (e.g. Verspaandonk, 2000b) indicates 
that Government’s expectation, that 15% savings were realisable from IT outsourcing, were 
influenced by several key studies. Particularly important were findings by Domberger, 
Hodge, and Lacity and Willcocks. This research was cited by informants, and in public 
documents, as evidence that carefully-managed outsourcing frequently leads to substantial 
cost savings of 20% to 30% or more. However, closer analysis of this work reveals that a 
more complex relationship exists. 
For example, research by Domberger (CTC, 1999) suggested savings of 30%+ from 
outsourcing were common, and this research played an important role in setting 
Government expectations (Rouse, 2002; Walker and Walker, 2000). Walker and Walker 
(2000) identify several flaws in some of this research, and careful examination of the most 
recent data (CTC, 1999) reveals that while such savings were common for simple 
outsourced services such as cleaning and catering, increases of around 8% were observed 
when IT services were outsourced. 
Hodge (1996) carried out a meta-analysis of a large number of quantitative studies of 
general outsourcing by government agencies. His studies translated results from earlier 
studies to a common metric, so that data could be consolidated and re-analysed. He found 
savings of between 8% and 14% were possible but these were largely for simple services, 
like garbage collection, or cleaning (Hodge, 1996). However, savings for corporate services 
(which would include IT) increased on average by 5% (Hodge, 1999).  
In relation to IT services, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) reported cross case comparisons that 
suggested most outsourcing (70%+ of the 33 outsourcing cases with discernible outcomes) 
led to savings. They found that “selective” outsourcing of IT services was particularly 
successful. For their selective cases reporting cost savings  a large majority (85%) of the 
selective outsourcing cases that reported an outcome  savings were, on average, a 
substantial 23.8% (data from Lacity and Willcocks, 1998 re-analysed in Rouse, 2002). But 
the authors acknowledge in that paper that these cases are not statistically representative.  
The fact that these cases are not statistically representative means they shed no light on the 
success rates that might be expected in the wider population. Furthermore, researchers 
often have difficulty gaining access to case study sites involving problems or failure. So the 
positive odds of success represented by the cases studied by Lacity and Willcocks (1998; 
2001), and the substantial cost savings reported for selective outsourcing (1998) are not 
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those that typical outsourcing purchasers can expect. In spite of these limitations, the 
success ratios reported by these authors were cited by a number of informants involved in 
the initiative as justification for their strong belief that their selective outsourcing would 
succeed. 
Contemporary evidence indicates that selective, well-managed outsourcing still 
involves considerable risks 
In following the various recommended practices discussed above, the Australian Federal 
Government was typical of the large organisations studied in the University of Melbourne 
survey. Most of those respondents also followed recommended practices like selective 
outsourcing; outsourcing infrastructure services; employing short contracts; benchmarking IT 
services; and detailing services and service levels in their contracts. Despite this, most 
survey respondents were disappointed with their IT outsourcing experiences, with only just 
over 1/3 (36%) reporting a positive score on a measure of satisfaction and value. Less than 
a third of respondents reported positive scores for measures of strategic benefits, 
technology benefits, and economies of scale. When it came to cost savings, only 7.4% of 
respondents reported substantial savings, and only 42.1% reported any savings at all. 
One explanation for the problems experienced by the first four agencies in the Federal 
initiative is that IT outsourcing  even selective outsourcing involving short contracts and 
infrastructure services  is much riskier than has been recognised. The fact that previous 
research did not quantify levels of risks appears to have led to unrealistic expectations and 
over-optimism. Much of the research on risks has been based on case studies (e.g. Lacity 
and Hirschheim, 1993) or subjective-argumentative research (e.g. Earl, 1996). It may be that 
decision-makers discounted the risks described by researchers in the belief that they were 
rare, or only encountered by poorly managed organisations.  
That risks are substantial is evident in the responses to the University of Melbourne study. 
Analysis revealed that risks ranged from high to very high for both public and private sector 
organisations in that survey (Rouse, 2002). Negative outcomes like failing to get expected 
cost savings; inability to concentrate on core business, failure to avoid technology 
obsolescence, and inability to control costs were reported by the majority of organisations, 
while substantial problems (like unexpected cost increases, loss of organisational 
knowledge, and difficulties projecting future requirements) were encountered by many. The 
proposition that these risks were not expected is consistent with the low level of satisfaction 
expressed by respondents, as low satisfaction is usually the consequence when positive 
expectations are not confirmed by actual experiences (c.f. Rouse, 2002). 
In light of this contextual information, the negative experiences reported in the reviews 
conducted by the Auditor-General and by Humphry no longer appear to be examples of 
flawed management failing to achieve what other, better managed organisations were 
achieving. Instead they are relatively typical of the experiences of Australia’s top private and 
public organisations 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Attributions of the causes of outsourcing failure need to be examined carefully 
The Humphry Report recommended the abandonment of compulsory centralised and 
clustered IT outsourcing for future arrangements, because of the potential negative impacts 
this approach had on operational goals. But Humphry did not go so far as to suggest that IT 
outsourcing itself was inherently problematic, or that achieving significant cost savings was 
unlikely. The fact that the Auditor-General had found that two of the first three arrangements 
would never achieve substantial savings was not acknowledged. Instead, Humphry cited the 
substantial savings observed for Cluster 3 by the Auditor-General as evidence that 
outsourcing can be an economic success. Paradoxically, Humphry also recommended 
abandonment of the clustering strategy that contributed to these savings.  
The tenor of Humphry’s Report suggests he strongly believed that well-managed 
outsourcing usually succeeds. He argues (2001:24) that “the debate over cost savings has 
tended to obscure other benefits, which can arise from properly implemented outsourcing 
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[emphasis added] such as wider access to technology and technical skills, strategic 
partnership in a dynamic technical environment and an opportunity to manage capital 
expenditures more effectively”. This belief would have influenced him to seek evidence of 
poor management as a cause of the failure to meet expectations, as would the political 
pragmatics of such an Inquiry. 
Humphry did indeed suggest that the initiative had been compromised by poor management 
on the part of the central management agency (OGIT, later renamed “OASITO”). Humphry 
reported that decision-makers (within OASITO) had concentrated on contractual rather than 
operational issues, and had failed to ensure co-operation from line management. In addition, 
he suggested that agency management had been resistant and obstructive: “It is widely 
accepted that agencies’ inertia and resistance to change contributed significantly to the 
delays (2001:9)... There is a need for [an] agency’s executive and its senior managers to 
demonstrate support for the process and commitment to its success (2001:14). 
These explanations are not refutable, and so are not helpful. If decision-makers in OASITO 
had not concentrated on legal and contractual issues, they would have been rightly 
criticised. And how could decision-makers know “how much” attention to implementation risk 
was sufficient? Furthermore, any problematic strategy (where key expectations are not 
being met) is likely to result in resistance from some line managers, particularly if the 
strategy hampers their operational goals (the situation described by both the Auditor-
General and Humphry). Hence the evidence of poor management and line management 
opposition becomes self-referential: because the initiative failed, decision makers must have 
failed to gain “sufficient” co-operation of stakeholders and must not have devoted “enough” 
attention to operational issues. And if line managers expressed concerns about the initiative, 
this “lack of buy in” (2001:11) must have contributed to the failure to achieve the original 
goals. Yet when these propositions are examined, causal links are not strongly supported. 
Another factor implicated by Humphry was the clustering that occurred in two of the three 
contracts studied by the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General too had suggested that 
clustering had exacerbated difficulties encountered by agencies. Although Humphry 
defended the original clustering strategy, he suggested it had outlived its usefulness and 
was by 2000 no longer necessary (2001:12). Consequently, a key element of his 
recommendations was the abandonment of requirements that agencies form grouped 
contracts (i.e. cluster). Yet clustering had allowed small agencies to benefit from larger 
agencies’ contract negotiation and management capacities, and attraction to vendors. 
Significantly, the only contract of those studied by the Auditor-General that was likely to 
succeed financially was Cluster 3, which chose to renew its clustered contract with CSC in 
August 2002.  
When this case is examined in depth, there is little evidence that it was clustering, the 
implementation flaws described by Humphry, or the concerns expressed by some line 
managers, that resulted in the abandonment of the initiative. Much of the evidence cited by 
Humphry about risks and downsides of outsourcing had already been presented to the 1997 
Senate Inquiry (SFPARC, 1997) but at that stage the Government had decided that the risks 
were manageable. What had changed by 2000 was that the Auditor-General had revealed 
that the downsides of IT outsourcing, (including the managerial attention that had to be 
devoted to managing the arrangement, and the difficulties of implementing within a short 
timeframe) were substantial, whether or not agencies were involved in clusters. 
Furthermore, the risks that agencies would experience lock-in with the incumbent vendor at 
end of the contract were much more visible, as a result of the failure to attract more than one 
bidder to the fourth contract (DEETYA-EN). At the same time, the likelihood of 
commensurate financial and industry development benefits was much lower than had been 
expected. Consequently the risk/return ratio of the initiative was by then demonstrably, and 
publicly, poor. 
When the same arguments about risks and problems were presented to Humphry in 2000, 
together with evidence that impact of these risks were indeed widespread and damaging, he 
determined that these risks were by then so significant that the initiative should be 
reconfigured. Given the damaging findings of the Auditor-General’s Report, it is unlikely that 
he had any other choices open to him.  
Rouse and Corbitt  
8 
It is tempting to see difficulties reported to Humphry as peculiar to the particular form of 
implementation (e.g. use of a prime-contractor model, clustering, or exercise of senior-
management fiat), or the result of poor management. However, the difficulties can also be 
seen as examples of an important, and largely inherent, trade-off first identified by Lacity and 
Hirschheim (1995): certain strategies (like requiring the line to adopt common standards and 
to consolidate their IT requirements) whether implemented by vendors or internally, can lead 
to moderate cost savings, but these are often at the expense of the line’s operational goals.  
As an earlier supporter of outsourcing, it is unlikely that Humphry would have attributed the 
failure of the arrangement to an inherent trade-off between cost savings goals and 
operational needs, or to generally high risks that outsourcing benefits will fail to materialise 
(as revealed by Rouse’s 2002 analysis of the University of Melbourne survey). Humphry had 
been one of the industry specialists on the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee that encouraged 
the Government’s adoption of IT outsourcing and the clustering approach (Humphry, 
2001:22). A reading of his report suggests a strong commitment to the intrinsic value of IT 
outsourcing, and its capacity to produce demonstrable benefits if well-managed. Humphry’s 
commitment to the potential benefits of outsourcing is understandable given the advice and 
research presented to Government at that time the IT&T Policy Advisory Committee made 
its recommendations (1997)  
The fact that the initiative failed to achieve goals that, in hindsight, appear very unlikely to 
have been achieved puts the case in a different light. So does the evidence (from the 
University of Melbourne survey) that many other organisations were also failing to achieve 
similar goals. This suggests that Humphry’s attributions, and his targeting of resistant line 
managers and a less-than-competent OASITO (which was consequently disbanded) could 
represent a search for scapegoats for the failure of a policy that was far riskier than was, at 
the time, recognised.  
Some organisations will never discover that their cost expectations are not being met 
Hodge (1996) observed that the more rigorous the evaluation studies of outsourcing, the 
lower the reported savings. This is because more rigorous studies included costs ignored by 
less rigorous ones, and controlled for other critical factors. An issue canvassed in Walker 
and Walker (2000) is the quality of cost and savings projections used to justify Government 
sourcing decisions. Yet when data is gathered by researchers, where do informants obtain 
their figures when asked what savings (or dis-savings) they have made from a sourcing 
decision? As the Auditor-General’s Review reveals, to answer the question of what savings 
were actually obtained is complex, expensive, and requires substantial expertise. Rolf 
Jester, a Gartner spokesman, has suggested (in The Australian, 23 Jan 2001), that after as 
little as 12 months it is not even possible to establish with any certainty what the savings 
were, an observation also made by the Auditor-General.  
The process of determining savings requires comparison of four imprecise projections, each 
involving measurement errors and technical and financial assumptions. These four 
projections include: 
• Projections made at the time vendors tender about the service bundle that would 
be needed over the life of the contract; 
• Contemporary projections of the likely costs of supplying these services using in-
house resources: 
• Contemporary projections of the chosen vendor’s likely costs to supply these 
services and the difference between this and those projected for in-house 
delivery; 
• Retrospective projections of what the services actually supplied by the vendor 
(which may be different to those projected at time of contract) might have cost if 
supplied in-house. 
Even the calculation of the actual costs and services provided under the outsourcing 
arrangements involve some imprecision. As the case study has illustrated, this calculation 
too can depend on assumptions and interpretation of both the contract and accounting 
conventions.  
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The Auditor-General’s analysis revealed that there was a substantial difference between the 
services projected at the time the contract was signed, and those actually needed by Cluster 
3 over the first 12 months, as well as differences between projected and actual service 
volumes. These were not the result of ignorance or failure to attend to the issues, but rather 
a result of unexpected business initiatives (ANAO, 2000:196). As Lacity and Hirschheim 
(1993) revealed, such differences can rapidly consume projected savings. There were also 
substantial differences between the costs expected for these services, and the actual costs, 
as a result of different assumptions about how staff would respond to voluntary retrenchment 
offers; how contractual terms would be interpreted, how quickly certain technology upgrades 
would occur; as well as some minor errors in the complex financial models used to evaluate 
tenders (ANAO, 2000:196-197). This is an important lesson for decision-makers, as many 
organisations could be expected to encounter similar situations.  
Cluster 3 was the only agency in a position to even attempt the various comparisons 
discussed above. The clustered Group 5 argued that to carry out this analysis would be 
prohibitively time consuming and difficult, and might lead to distortions because of the high 
level of error involved. ATO was too early into its contract to measure savings at the time the 
Attorney-General reported. It is likely that similar circumstances will prevent most other IT 
outsourcers from conducting post-implementation reviews of actual cost savings achieved. 
This means that reported “savings” will often be based upon a very optimistic expectation, 
and that conflicting information may never be formally gathered to challenge the initial 
expectation.  
This is a particular problem for IT outsourcing researchers, because unless purchaser 
organisations have in fact carried out a comprehensive post-outsourcing review, many 
“savings” figures reported to researchers are likely to be those projected at the time the 
contract is signed, and so to significantly over-state actual savings 
The Auditor-General’s analysis of the Group 5 and ATO business cases revealed further, 
much greater error margins in projected costs associated with failure on the part of the 
decision makers to spot flaws in the assumptions that underlay projections made largely by 
specialist consultants. According to the Auditor-General these flaws meant that projected 
savings of 10% (Group 5) and 18% (ATO) would result in probable cost increases, or, at 
best, savings of 5.4% (ANAO, 2000:167) though these savings would quickly be eaten up by 
management costs and by unexpected changes. Analytic flaws like these are not likely to be 
revealed even when post implementation reviews are carried out, unless reviews are 
performed by staff with specialist financial skills, such as those held in the office of the 
Auditor-General. 
Without the Auditor-General’s independent (and to some extent, unwelcome) public review, 
Government decision makers might not have discovered that their expectations were not 
being met for some years, if at all. But this situation is likely to apply to many other 
organisations involved in IT outsourcing. Detailed analysis, like that conducted by the 
Auditor-General, may well reveal that savings are eaten up by the same factors that were at 
play with the initiative: changes in business requirements and volumes, misunderstandings 
about what is meant by complex contractual terms, delays associated with evolving 
technologies, incorrect assumptions, and in complex business cases, possibly errors.  
IT outsourcing is expected to lead to multiple outcomes, some of which are 
antagonistic 
An examination of trade and consulting literature in the last few years reveals a new theme: 
only naive decision-makers expect to make substantial savings from IT outsourcing: instead, 
sophisticated managers are seeking strategic benefits, like access to new skills and 
technologies and concentration on core competencies. This theme can be discerned by 
examining sites like the vendor-dominated Outsourcing Institute, or those of consultants 
advising on outsourcing.  
A cynic might be tempted to see this as a response to the failure over a decade to 
demonstrate widespread substantial savings from IT outsourcing. However, another 
possible interpretation is related to the findings of the Federal initiative. This is that IT 
outsourcing is usually initiated to achieve multiple goals, some of which may need to be 
Rouse and Corbitt  
10 
traded off. The Federal government was seeking cost savings, better, or at least no worse 
impact on operational business; and industry development. The evidence from the various 
documents consulted was that they could achieve some of these goals, but not all. The 
ATO, for example, has reported substantial technology improvements as a result of its 
outsourcing arrangement, but reports of substantial savings are noticeable by their absence. 
According to the Auditor-General, these were always unlikely. Humphry reported a number 
of negative consequences of agencies’ attempts to meet industry development goals (which 
were later downgraded as a result of the Humphry Review), and noted that these goals 
conflicted with agency’s operational goals (2001: 36). Elsewhere Lacity and Willcocks (2001) 
reported that the South Australian Government achieved substantial industry development, 
but evidence for substantial cost savings from that arrangement is slim. Rouse’s (2002) re-
analysis of the University of Melbourne survey revealed that while the majority of purchasers 
reported obtaining new skills and positive vendor service from their outsourcing 
arrangements, this was at the expense of economic benefits (including cost savings); 
technology benefits, and strategic benefits.  
The noted economist Shlomo Maital (1994) has observed that only inefficient organisations 
can achieve organisational improvements without trading off different goals. The Federal 
Government had been led by advice to expect that they would not encounter unacceptable 
trade offs when outsourcing IT, but they were unpleasantly surprised. When cost savings 
were achieved, the operational impacts were quite negative, while arrangements (like, 
reportedly, the ATO) that succeeded in meeting technology and business goals did so at the 
expense of substantial savings. The “solution” now in place as a result of the Humphry 
Review (that is, requiring individual agencies to market test their service requirements) may 
not end up solving the problems revealed by the Auditor-General’s and Humphry Reports.  
Reducing complex, rich observations to simplified “recommended practices” has 
some limitations 
The failure of an organisation that went to such trouble to manage its risks raises questions 
about the “operationalisation” of the recommended practices OASITO followed. These 
practices were drawn largely from the case studies carried out by Lacity and Hirschheim in 
the early 90s, and the post-hoc cross-case analyses done when Lacity and Willcocks began 
reviewing their combined research (c.f. Lacity et al., 1996; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). 
Examination of the original case descriptions (for example those in Lacity and Hirschheim, 
1993) reveal complexity and richness, yet this richness was eventually distilled (Lacity et al., 
1996) into a number of relatively simple prescriptions that may not have captured the 
underlying causal factors.  
One example is “selective outsourcing”, which has frequently been described as leading to 
success (Lacity et al. 1996; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; 2001). Statistical analysis of the 
University of Melbourne survey had failed to find any differences in success measures 
between “selective” and “total” outsourcers (Rouse, 2002). In seeking an explanation for 
this, it became clear that the definition of “selective” outsourcing is malleable. While the label 
was originally used to describe outsourcing between 20% and 80% of IT budget (Lacity et 
al., 1996); more recently (2001) it has been used by the authors to describe outsourcing as 
low as 10% of IT budget. Informants in the focus groups conducted by Rouse (2002) tended 
to define “selective” outsourcing in terms of what it was not, that is “total” outsourcing. Total 
outsourcing has been presented in the academic literature as a risky and discredited 
strategy. Yet, as both Lacity and Willcocks (2000) and the University of Melbourne study 
identified that only around 7% of organisations engage in “total” outsourcing, there are very 
few decision-makers who would not perceive themselves as being involved in the 
recommended “selective” outsourcing.  
As another example, the recommended practice “involve line management and IT 
management in the decision” came about because some of the problematic cases studied 
by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) excluded one or other of these groups from the decision. In 
the Federal initiative, the Government did involve both line management and IT in their 
decisions. There was extensive consultation and discussion amongst OASITO and line and 
IT staff in all the agencies involved. Not all agreed with the decision, but stakeholders had 
many opportunities to express their reservations through this consultation, and through the 
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Senate Inquiry that took place during 1997. When seeking to reconcile this observation it 
becomes apparent that the term “involvement” is very general It does not, for example, 
necessarily imply that active support from all parties is required for success. There are many 
examples in the IS and management literatures of senior management instituting ultimately 
successful organisational programs that encountered disagreements and dissent. 
Furthermore, such simplicity is not apparent in Lacity and Hirschheim’s original discussion of 
this practice which was concerned with the problems of excluding one or other viewpoint. 
Again, the impact of this imprecision is that it is likely to be only in those (probably rare) 
organisations that actively exclude one or other group that decision-makers would not 
perceive themselves as involving both IT and line management. 
It is likely that many of the recommended practices are necessary, but not sufficient for 
achieving success, particularly as the probability of their not being followed at all is low. For 
example, it is unlikely that an organisation involved in a multi-million dollar venture would not 
establish post management structures and processes of some kind, yet the Federal initiative 
has illustrated that such processes, even when based on “international best practice” advice 
do not guarantee success. A similar observation can be made about careful market testing 
and crafting of detailed contracts. The conclusion that such practices are not sufficient to 
guarantee success implies that decision makers may be unwittingly led to under-estimate 
their own risks when outsourcing IT, because most would be able to reassure themselves 
that they were following recommended risk-minimising practices.  
It is significant that there has been virtually no evidence provided about how well such 
practices protect against failure. The bulk of research conducted to date is either case study 
based, or subjective-argumentative, and so is not able to provide probabilistic estimates of 
success and risks, or the moderating effects that recommended management practices 
have on these. Quantitative studies have generally been small, so that the observed 
relationships could easily have occurred purely by chance. So although there is convincing 
qualitative evidence that failing to follow these practices can lead to problems, decision 
makers have no information about what risks they run even when such management 
practices are followed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a very different view of the Federal IT Infrastructure case than has 
been presented in the press and some academic literature. In light of the contemporary 
survey data, it is our view that the case study is not an example of poor decisions and 
implementation. Instead it illustrates a decision predicated on research and advice that was 
overoptimistic about likely benefits if IT outsourcing, and unrealistically confident that good 
management could overcome the associated risks. Many of the outcomes for this “fiasco” 
are in fact typical of those of contemporary Australian organisations, and probably of many 
large organisations.  
A key implication of the case is that decision-makers need to frame their decisions in light of 
recent research about the relative risks and returns from IT outsourcing. The case reveals 
considerable uncertainty surrounding likely outcomes, and highlights the possibility that key 
assumptions about costs, savings, managerial effort, or the effects of outsourcing on 
operational performance might be incorrect. Framing IT outsourcing as a quite risky venture 
(in contrast to the comfortable and reassuring message provided by many vendors and 
consultants) demands similar strategies to those undertaken when examining any potentially 
risky venture. Such framing suggests careful examination of assumptions, recognition of the 
high levels of uncertainty involved in estimates, sensitivity analysis, “risk-boxing” of initial 
forays, and, as was done by the Auditor-General, early, and ideally, independent, evaluation 
of the achievement of goals set for the venture.  
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